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This paper discusses certain views in contemporary philosophy especially relevant 
for the theme of translation and meaning. First, Kuhn and Feyerabend claim that 
comprehensive belief systems which differ sufficiently are “incommensurable” or 
mutually untranslatable, because they have no common meanings; according to 
them, change of a belief system inevitably leads to change of meanings. Second, 
the famous thesis of “the indeterminacy of translation” by W.V. Quine is discussed. 
According to this thesis, it is possible to construe several conflicting translations 
compatible with all observable data, all of these translations being equally correct. 
If this is true, meanings themselves are deeply indeterminate.
It is argued that both theses lead to intolerable problems and that a notion of 
meaning is needed which is more stable and more thick. The new, “externalist” 
theory of meaning (developed by Kripke, Putnam and others) submits that meanings 
do not depend only on what is in the speaker’s mind, but that also history and the 
speaker’s social and physical environment play some role in determining what the 
meanings are. It is suggested that this theory helps to avoid the problems of the 
above views.
1. Introduction
In contemporary philosophy, not to mention in the humanities and social sciences 
as well, there is a great deal of talk about meaning. However, philosophers’ views 
on what is meaning vary greatly. The American philosopher William Lycan (Lycan 
1984, 272) has argued that part of this disagreement derives from the wide 
acceptance of what he calls “the Double Indexical Theory of Meaning”. He suggests 
that it explains why most disputes over the nature of meaning have seemed so 
intractable. Here it is:
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MEANING =def Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me 
now.  
My own intuitive starting point is the following commonsense truism: the meaning 
of an expression, whatever it is, is what the expression and its (exact, correct) 
translation (assuming there is one) share, i.e. they have ‘the same meaning’. This 
notion may be called linguistic meaning, or lexical meaning. There are certainly 
many other notions of meaning, but this is the one I shall focus on below.
In what follows I shall introduce and critically evaluate a couple of highly 
influential views on meaning in contemporary philosophy which are directly related 
to translation. I shall also briefly sketch a new alternative approach which avoids 
the problems of those views. 
2. The Radicals of the New Philosophy of Science
2.1. The incommensurability thesis and the impossibility of translation
In the 1960s, a radical new trend emerged in the philosophy of science. This is 
largely due to two philosophers, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend (see Kuhn 
1962, 1970; Feyerabend 1962, 1963, 1965a, 1965b, 1970, 1975). Their arguments 
were directed primarily against the received positivist view on science which was 
dominant in the 1920s-1950s. However, their views have much wider implications. 
The key claims of Kuhn and Feyerabend are the following.  First, they submitted 
(against the received view) that under closer scrutiny the history of science 
demonstrates:
(a) The thesis of scientific revolutions:
Scientific knowledge does not accumulate; there are radical breaks and 
revolutions in the development of science. Often a new theory conflicts with or 
contradicts the old one.1  
The radicals also endorsed a certain view of meaning:
(b) The contextual, or holistic, theory of meaning
The meaning of an expression that occurs in a scientific theory (or a system of 
beliefs) depends solely on the principles of the theory (the system of beliefs). To 
1   This had been emphasized already earlier e.g. by Karl Popper. He did not, however, accept the 
further claims of Kuhn and Feyerabend. This first thesis is now almost universally accepted among 
the philosophers of science. 
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know what the expression means requires a knowledge of the theory (the system 
of beliefs). 
The above two views lead us to the next thesis: 
(c) The thesis of meaning-variance
The meaning of an expression that occurs in a scientific theory (a system of 
beliefs) changes when the theory is modified or replaced by another theory in 
which that expression also occurs. 
This, in turn, leads to the final radical thesis:
(d) The incommensurability thesis
Competing theories (belief systems) are incommensurable. There is no way of 
comparing them. 
In Kuhn’s words, the tradition “that emerges from a scientific revolution is not 
only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone 
before” (Kuhn 1962, 103). This view is not restricted to natural science. It applies 
equally to all sorts of myths, belief systems, world views, etc. Consequently, it has 
also been very influential in the humanities.  
Especially Kuhn (1970) has explicated the idea of incommensurability in terms 
of translation: The sufficiently different frameworks are mutually untranslatable. 
One cannot be translated into another “without loss or change of meaning”. No fully 
adequate translation exists. The example Kuhn uses is the term ‘planet’. Before 
Copernicus it included the Sun and Moon but excluded the Earth, while now it 
excludes the former but includes the latter (Kuhn 1970).
There is, however, a qualification. The incommensurability thesis is assumed to 
be true only of ‘comprehensive’ theories (systems of belief) which differ in ‘major’ 
or ‘fundamental’ ways. Still, this is a truly radical conclusion: according to this view, 
it does not make sense to say that a later comprehensive scientific theory is more 
adequate, or is closer to the truth, than an earlier one. It is a consequence of the 
incommensurability thesis that there is no genuine progress in science.
For many, this consequence may be implausible enough to show that there 
must be something deeply wrong with the view. But for those who are happy with 
this conclusion, it should be pointed out that the Kuhn-Feyerabend view, or the 
incommensurability thesis, has a number of intolerable internal problems. 
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2.2. Problems with the incommensurability thesis 
It was soon recognized that the incommensurability thesis is not only hard to swallow, 
but leads to conclusions which are highly implausible and even inconsistent with its 
own starting points (see e.g. Shapere 1964, 1966; Achinstein 1968):2
(1) If the thesis were true, no two theories could contradict each other, for this 
requires that they can be compared. Yet, it was the very starting point that 
often a new theory conflicts with or contradicts the old one.
(2) If the thesis were true, any agreement between proponents of different theories 
is impossible. 
But if there can be no agreement and no disagreement, what sense is there 
to say that two theories are alternatives? That is, there would only be talking past 
each other, never disagreement.
(3) If the meaning of an expression in a theory depends entirely on the principles 
of that theory, the principles in effect define what the expression means. But 
then such principles would always be vacuously true – true solely by virtue of 
the meanings of their words. 
(4) If the thesis were true, a person could not learn a theory by having it explained 
to the person using any words whose meanings the person understands before 
learning the theory. In order to know what the expressions which occur in a 
theory mean, one must already know the theory. 
An Interim Conclusion: These consequences are so implausible that it is 
better to reject the theses leading to them.  Certainly the meanings of expressions 
sometimes change, but it is not reasonable to postulate this massive and extreme 
meaning variance. There must be more to the meaning of an expression than the 
beliefs, or the theory, associated with it. The contextual theory of meaning must be 
false. 
Take, for example, the notions of Thales, a natural philosopher in ancient 
Greece who believed that everything consists of water. Clearly his views and those 
of modern chemistry are radically different. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that ‘Hudor’, as Thales called it, needs to have a different meaning from our 
‘water’ and that ‘Hudor’ cannot be correctly translated as ‘water’; there does not 
seem to be any principled reason for believing so. 
2   For later critical discussion, se e.g.  Devitt 1984/1991; Hacking 1983; Kitcher 1993; Niiniluoto 
1999; Psillos 1999. 
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Similarly, the beliefs associated with fire by Aristotle (who believed that fire is 
one of the four elements), Joseph Priestley (who believed that there is a special 
burning ‘principle’ phlogiston which is released during combustion) and a modern 
chemist, who believes in the oxygen theory of combustion, differ greatly. And yet 
we can translate ‘Pur’, as  Aristotle called it, perfectly well as ‘Fire’. Moreover, there 
is no reason to think that Priestley’s ‘combustion’ and our use of the word now differ 
in meaning. Or, to recall Kuhn’s example of ‘planet’, why not say that its meaning 
hasn’t changed, but that we have only revised our beliefs about which heavenly 
bodies belong to the extension of ‘planet’.
In sum, the problems associated with the incommensurability thesis are 
intolerable. Hence one must assume that meaning is usually stable despite changes 
in belief. This idea is captured in the following maxim: “Differences of meaning are 
not to be postulated without necessity” (Ziff calls this ‘Occam’s eraser’; see Putnam, 
1965, 130). Hence the meaning of an expression must not be equated with, or be 
assumed to be determined solely by the beliefs associated with the expression. It 
must be – at least in part – independent of the latter.  It is thus important to clearly 
distinguish the linguistic meaning of an expression and the conceptions associated 
with it.
3. W. V. Quine:  The Indeterminacy of Translation Thesis
3.1. Quine’s thesis
In contemporary philosophy one of the most widely-debated themes is the thought 
experiment of radical translation and the indeterminacy of translation thesis by the 
American philosopher W V. Quine (see e.g. Quine 1960, 1969, 1992).  
The thesis says that:
(1) It is possible to construe several conflicting translations compatible with all 
observable data; and
(2) there is no fact of the matter which one is correct.  
It is especially the latter part of the thesis that has annoyed many philosophers. 
Note, however, that Quine does not postulate some formidable obstacles for 
translation, or deny the possibility of correct translation – rather the opposite: “The 
fact remains that lexicography lives, and is important. Translation is important, 
often right, often wrong. The indeterminacy thesis denies none of this, but tells 
us that right translations can sharply diverge” (Quine 1990).  In other words, there 
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may be, according to Quine, several perfectly adequate but mutually incompatible 
translations; and there are no further facts concerning meanings that would make 
one of them the correct one. 
Quine has illuminated his thesis by his famous thought experiment of “radical 
translation”: Quine invites us to imagine that a linguist undertakes to translate into 
English some hitherto unknown language – one which is neither historically nor 
culturally linked to any known language. It is further supposed that the linguist has 
no access to bilinguals versed in the two languages, English and what Quine calls 
‘Jungle’. (By ‘radical translation’, he means such an extreme situation). Thus, the 
only empirical data the linguist has to go on in constructing a ‘Jungle-to-English’ 
translation manual are instances of the native speakers’ behaviour in publicly 
recognizable circumstances: “There is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is 
to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable circumstances” (Quine 1992, 38).
Quine next submits that it is very likely that the theoretical sentences (i.e. 
sentences that go beyond what is observable) of ‘Jungle’ can be translated into 
English in incompatible yet equally acceptable ways. Hence translation, and 
consequently meaning itself, are indeterminate, Quine concludes. 
However, Quine’s main interest is not in the methodology of field linguistics, but 
is much more philosophical. He aims to attack philosophers’ uncritical use of the 
notion of meaning by showing that there may not be such things as meanings if 
these are assumed to be something determinate: 
The point of my thought experiment in radical translation was philosophical: a critique 
of the uncritical notion of meanings and, therewith, of introspective semantics. I was 
concerned to expose its empirical limits. A sentence has meaning, people thought, and 
another sentence is its translation if it has the same meaning. This, we see, will not do. 
(Quine 1987, 9.)
But how does Quine end up with his thesis? I submit that he has reasoned, 
roughly, along the following lines:3
(1) To understand a language is to know its meanings. Meanings are thus whatever 
a competent speaker-hearer of a language knows.
(2) Learning to understand a language, that is, to know its meanings, must turn 
solely on observable use of the expression, there being no innate language 
and no telepathy.
3   There is much disagreement about how one should interpret Quine and what his reasons are 
for maintaining  his thesis. I have given my interpretation in Raatikainen 2005. 
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(3) There is thus nothing in the meaning of an expression beyond what is to be 
gleaned from the overt use of the expression.
(4) One can construct incompatible manuals of translation that are consistent with 
all observable use. 
(5) There is no fact of the matter which translation is the correct one, because there 
is nothing more in meaning itself beyond what is in observable use. 
3.2. Problems with the indeterminacy thesis
Quine’s thesis does not lead directly to such obvious absurdities as the radical 
meaning variance and incommensurability theses of Kuhn and Feyerabend. 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to accept, and arguably it is in conflict with some other 
central views to which Quine commits himself. Namely, Quine contrasts semantics 
(or the theory of meaning) with natural science. In all sciences, theories are 
underdetermined by observation; there are always several alternative hypotheses 
which are consistent with all observable data. Nevertheless, Quine holds that in the 
case of natural science only one hypothesis is true and others false, whether we 
can find this out or not. There is a fact of the matter here, and so Quine is a realist 
with respect to natural science. Recently this has become the standard view in the 
philosophy of science – it is generally seen as the most plausible alternative to the 
positivist view and radical relativism of Kuhn and Feyerabend. In semantics, on the 
other hand, the situation is, according to Quine, different. Because of their special 
connection to language acquisition, meanings cannot contain anything beyond 
observable behaviour. There is no further fact of the matter in semantics. 
But it is difficult to see how a theoretical (i.e. non-observational) sentence in 
natural science could then be definitely true or false in the way Quine too believes. 
What makes a statement true is presumably its meaning and facts together. Quine 
also accepts the general idea that the meaning of a sentence determines its truth 
conditions. But if the meaning of a theoretical sentence is radically indeterminate, 
as Quine suggests, it is very hard to understand what then guarantees that it has a 
determinate truth value. Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis thus seems to 
undermine his realism concerning natural science.
It is thus better to to reject Quine’s reasoning. If Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s notion 
of meaning was intolerably unstable, Quine’s notion of meaning is too thin – too 
anaemic. There must be more to meaning than what speakers can glean from 
observable behaviour, or what they learn to know when they acquire their language. 
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4. Semantic Externalism
In the past few decades, a new kind of  theory of meaning and reference has 
emerged. It is known under various names, e.g. “the new theory of reference” or 
“semantic externalism”. Its founding fathers are philosophers Saul Kripke, Keith 
Donnellan, and Hilary Putnam.4 It rebels against the traditional view that the 
meaning of an expression is determined by the beliefs, descriptions or theories 
speakers associate with the expression.  
Particularly important are the various “arguments from ignorance and error” 
presented by these philosophers. These aim to show that people may succesfully 
refer with an expression, and mean by it what it means in the language, although 
they are too ignorant to have sufficient knowledge to identify the referent(s) uniquely, 
or may even have false beliefs that are better satisfied by other entities than the 
referent(s) – or perhaps nothing satisfies them.
Kripke (1972) considers, among other things, two Biblical examples. First, 
consider ‘Moses’. It is unlikely that anybody has accomplished all, or even most 
of the deeds, that the Bible relates to Moses, and that most of us associate with 
the name ‘Moses’. It is nevertheless possible that by ‘Moses’ we refer to a real 
historical figure. Or suppose that no prophet was ever swallowed by a big fish or a 
whale. But still, Kripke suggests, the name ‘Jonah’ again probably refers to a real 
historical person. 
Or think of whales. Earlier it was generally believed that whales are fish, in 
other words, that they belong to the extension of the word ‘fish’. But we have since 
learned that, appearances notwithstanding, they are mammals. This means that 
they never belonged to the extension of ‘fish’; people only mistakenly believed they 
do. There is no change of meaning of ‘fish’ here, only a revision of belief on what 
entities belong to the extension of ‘fish’. 
Putnam (1975a) was concerned with two traditional assumptions: 
(I)  That knowing the meaning of an expression is just a matter of being in a 
certain psychological state.
(II) That the meaning of an expression determines its extension (in the sense 
that sameness of meaning entails sameness of extension). 
4   See Putnam 1970, 1973, 1975a, 1975b; Kripke 1972; Donnellan 1972. See also Devitt 1981. 
Devitt and Sterelny 1987 is a good overview.
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Putnam aimed to show “that these two assumptions are not jointly satisfied by 
any notion, let alone any notion of meaning” (Putnam 1975a, 217). He established 
first that if the meaning of a term determines its extension then so also must knowing 
its meaning. So it follows from assumptions (I) and (II) that a psychological state 
determines the extension. 
However, Putnam and others have presented arguments concluding that 
successful referring is possible even in a situation where nobody knows the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the extension of the expression, 
or is able to recognize reliably whether the expression applies or not.  Consequently, 
psychological states (and in particular, the beliefs, descriptions and theories 
associated with the expression) do not always and necessarily determine the 
reference or extension of the expression. Putnam has summed up this conclusion 
with his vivid slogan: “Meaning just ain’t in the head” (Putnam 1975a, 227). 
The most famous argument for such an externalism is Putnam’s Twin Earth 
thought experiment. Putnam invites us to imagine that somewhere, far far away 
there is a planet very much like Earth we may call Twin Earth. We may even assume 
that every one of us has a Doppelgänger there. Languages similar to ours are 
spoken there. There is, however, a peculiar difference that the liquid called ‘water’ 
is not H2O but a liquid whose chemical formula is very long and complicated; we 
may abbreviate it as XYZ. It is assumed that it is indistinguishable from water in 
normal circumstances; it tastes like water and quenches thirst like water. Lakes and 
seas of Twin Earth contain XYZ, it rains XYZ there, etc. 
Putnam next assumes that we roll the time back to, say, 1750, when chemistry 
was not developed on either Earth or Twin Earth. At the time nobody would have 
been able to tell XYZ from H2O. But still, Putnam submits, the extension of ‘water’ 
was just as much H2O on Earth, and the extension of ‘water’ was just as much 
XYZ on Twin Earth. This is what he means by his claim that meaning is partly 
constituted by the environment.
Or, to change the example, let us consider gold (this example is taken from 
Putnam 1994). What chrysos (gold) was in ancient Greece was not simply 
determined by the properties ancient Greeks believed gold to have. For otherwise 
it would have made no sense for an ancient Greek to ask himself, “Is there perhaps 
a way of telling that something isn’t really gold, even when it appears by all the 
standard tests to be gold?” But this is precisely the question Archimedes did put to 
himself, with a celebrated result.  Archimedes’s inquiry would have made no sense 
if Archimedes did not have the idea that something might appear to be gold (might 
pass the current tests for chrysos) while not really having the same nature as the 
paradigm examples of gold (see Putnam 1994, 443–444).
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5. Conclusions
The two earlier views on meaning had untenable consequences. The Kuhn-
Feyerabend view (and there are many somewhat similar views popular in the 
literature) make meanings much too unstable. Quine’s view did not have this 
problem, but it made meaning much too thin. They both assume that meanings are 
transparent to the speakers’ minds; speakers know the meaning of their language.
Semantic externalism, on the other hand, has the virtue that it makes meaning 
much more thick and stable. From its perspective, there is a definite sense in which 
the traditional assumption that to be competent with an expression amounts to the 
knowledge of its meaning is false. Meanings may often go beyond the knowledge, 
beliefs and observable behaviour of the speakers. 
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